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1. The origins and current situation of Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya minority  
1.1. Origins 
The Ahmadiyya movement is composed of the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835 - 
1908), the intensely charismatic leader of a late nineteenth century Islamic reform 
movement.1 In this period Ghulam Ahmed attracted a great deal of support from amongst the 
well-educated sections of Punjab’s urban Muslim elite, so much so that he became the chief 
representative of the Muslim cause in a series of intensely competitive debates which took 
place in Lahore during the course of the 1890s. Fired off by evangelical Christian 
missionaries’ efforts to use what they described as rational arguments to show that Christian 
theology was infinitely to superior to any of the local faiths, whose characteristics they were 
only too happy to describe in thoroughly scurrilous terms, representatives of the local Hindu, 
Sikh and Muslim communities soon set about challenging the missionaries’ arguments. 
However not only did they give as good as they got vis-à-vis their evangelical antagonists, 
they also began to attack each other, whilst also proposing reforms to their own tradition to 
bring it back to what they insisted was its original pristine state. However most of the 
everyday followers of the established tradition, and especially those resident in rural areas, 
quietly ignored the reformers’ modernising proposals.  
Nevertheless in urban contexts much more active discussions about these issues soon erupted. 
Like many other prophetically inclined Islamic reformists, Ghulam Ahmed’s impact and 
charisma gave rise to a theological debate about the source and character of his inspiration. 
Was he merely a mujtahid, and inspired reformer of Islam? Or was he the promised Mahdi, 
the messiah whom the Muslims, like the Christians, believed would appear shortly before 
judgement day? Or was his inspiration of such depth that he stood in the very shadow of the 
Prophet Mohammed himself? Or was he merely an impostor who was making a preposterous 
claim about standing in the line of Prophetic succession himself?  
Whilst Ghulam Ahmed does not appear to have any explicit position with respect to his own 
personal status – for he preferred simply to let his teachings and his accounts of his ecstatic 
experiences stand for themselves – his enthusiastic followers were only too keen to promote 
their hero up the hierarchy of prophetic inspiration. But to Muslims less impressed by 
Ghulam Ahmed’s teachings, his claims – or rather those promulgated by his most enthusiastic 
followers – appeared to be wholly sacrilegious. Specifically the suggestion that Ghulam 
Ahmed was a fully-fledged nabi, or Prophet, was seen as challenging the finality of the 
Prophet Mohammed’s Prophethood – a core component of Islamic theology. If it was true 
that the Ahmadis denied that Mohammed was the last and most perfect in the line – a charge 
which the Ahmadiyyas emphatically denied, insisting that their leader was merely a 
profoundly inspired mujtahid – it followed that they had fallen into kufr, unbelief, and as such 
were kaffir who stood entirely outside the pale of Islam.  
It is also worth noting that debates amongst the ‘ulema, the scholarly keepers of Islamic 
theological rectitude, can only be described as muscular in the extreme. In South Asia, and 
indeed throughout the Islamic contemporary world they specialise in nit-picking scrutiny in 
an effort to pull each other’s arguments apart. Moreover given that their objective is to search 
out the absolute truth, they refuse to have any truck with those whose arguments they 
conclude are ill-founded. Since analytical mistakes have the consequence of leading the 
                                                 
1  A detailed study of Ghulam Ahmed Mirza and his teaching can be found in Yohanan Freidman 
Prophesy Continuous: aspects of Ahmadi religious thought and its mediaeval backround  Delhi: 
Oxford University Press 2003. 
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faithful astray, ‘ulema have no compunctions of accusing rival scholars of being kaffir: and it 
goes without saying that their rivals most usually promptly return the compliment.  
1.2. Political developments 
Whilst the Doctors of Islamic Law – no less than the mediaeval Christian counterparts – have 
a well-deserved reputation for issuing scabrous denunciations of each other’s opinions, until 
quite recently the vast majority of everyday Muslims paid little attention to their arcane 
scholarly squabbles. During the course of the past century, however matters have become a 
great deal more complex. As each of the major religious traditions in South Asia – and then 
sectarian interpretations within each of those traditions – began to be utilised as vehicles for 
political mobilisation, so these theological arguments began to be used with ever increasing 
frequency as ammunition in political debates.  
At an ideological level Partition was in large part a product of just such processes, as 
politicians began to suggest that the Hindu, Sikh and Muslims traditions were so different 
from one another that they could not be expected to live together in a single nation – even 
though they had in fact been living side by side for the best part of a millennium. But even 
when Partition was indeed precipitated in 1947, these arguments did not stop: instead they 
shifted ground to a more sectarian focus. It was in this context that the Ahmadiyyas really 
began to run into trouble. 
Despite Ghulam Ahmed’s influence at the end of the nineteenth century, come Independence 
in 1947 his distinctive interpretation of the Prophet’s message had not attracted many 
followers outside the Punjab’s middle classes. On the other hand the Ahmadiyyas' rejection 
of the anachronistic teachings of the majority of classically trained ‘ulema, together with their 
openness to, and engagement with, European philosophical debates proved very attractive to 
many professionally and academically successful Muslims. Hence when the new Pakistani 
order began to crystallise in the aftermath of the chaos of 1947, Ahmadiyyas were 
disproportionately well represented in the senior ranks of government and administration.  
If the newly founded Pakistani state had managed to establish itself on a stable basis that 
might not have mattered much – however that was not to be. Not only did Jinnah, the Qaid-i-
Azam, succumb to tuberculosis within months of the foundation of the state, but the Prime 
Minister was assassinated little more than three years later. This was followed by a military 
take-over, the further partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh in a bloody and humiliating civil 
war, a brief democratic interlude and then yet further military take-overs – a process which 
continues to this day.  To put it bluntly, ever since its foundation Pakistan has suffered from 
what can best be described as a democratic deficit, such that all its governments, whether 
composed of elected civilians or of martial rulers, have had very shaky claims to legitimacy 
whenever they found themselves faced by popular dissent. One consequence of this is that 
Pakistan’s rulers have often found themselves extremely vulnerable to being thrown off-
course by extremist groups, most especially when they used accusations that the Government 
was going soft on ‘the enemies of Islam’ as means of whipping up popular dissent.  
1.3. The political role of ‘Islamist’ groups in Pakistan  
One of the perennial problems of Pakistan’s Islamist groups is that until the events of 9/11 
and its aftermath (of which more below) candidates nominated by parties of the religious 
right invariably attracted derisory support in both national and regional elections (on the 
relatively rare occasions when they were held). Hence one of the few ways to make their 
voices better heard was to make extra-parliamentary attacks on the government under one 
variant or another of the slogan ‘Islam in danger’. With this in mind the Ahmadis made an 
excellent target. Not only could they readily be accused of being kaffirs, but since so many of 
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them held senior positions in Government (if only because they were disproportionately 
represented amongst the better educated), but their very presence could be used to argue that 
because the Government harboured so many infidels in its ranks, thereby endangering the 
integrity of the Islamic state of Pakistan, it deserved to be toppled, elections or no elections. 
The first serious effort to achieve this end occurred early in 1953, when a group of ‘ulema 
submitted an ultimatum to the Prime Minster of Pakistan, demanding that the Ahmadiyyas 
should be formally classified as non-Muslims, and that in consequence the Foreign Minister 
Chaudhry Zafar Ullah Khan should be dismissed from office on the grounds that he was an 
Ahmadiyya. After a period of prevarication the Prime Minister eventually made it clear that 
he was not prepared to dismiss Chaudhry Zafar Ullah, the was a major anti-Ahmadiyya 
insurgency in Punjab, which eventually became so serious as to lead the authorities to declare 
martial law to bring the province back under control. In his magisterial Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 – which remains to this day 
one of the most instructive sources on the political and ideological foundations of the whole 
issue – Mr. Justice Munir concluded, amongst other things, that the principal blame for the 
disturbances had to be placed at the feet of two Islamic revivalist movements, the Majlis-e- 
Arar2 and the Jamaat-i-Islami. He concluded that both of these movements had deliberately 
used the slogan of khatme-Nabuwaat to stir up anti-Ahmadiyya feelings amongst the 
population at large, and to suggest that the Ahmadiyyas were not only kaffirs, but traitors to 
Pakistan, thereby precipitating widespread violence. 
 
 However despite Mr. Justice Munir’s scabrous conclusions – for he also went on to castigate 
the authorities for the failure to take firmer action in good time to contain these developments 
– his efforts to defend the legitimacy of plurality did not survive the test of time – or rather of 
politics. As Mr. Justice Munir made quite clear, the object of the proponents of khatme-
Nabuwaat was not just to demonstrate that the Ahmadiyyas were kaffirs, but also that 
Pakistan was (or at least should be) an Islamic republic in which such blaspheming heretics 
would have no place. But although the authorities eventually decided that they would have no 
truck with such arguments in 1953, when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto found his 
popularity fading a few years later, he made a last desperate throw to restore his credibility by 
turning to the religious right for support. In an effort to so he introduced the notorious 
Ordinance XX in 1984, which declared that the Ahmadis did indeed stand outside the fold of 
Islam. This was the origin of the notorious amendments to Sections 295 and 298 of the 
Pakistan Penal Code, passed under the subsequent military regime headed by General Zia-ul-
Haq. 
 
                                                 
2  During the early 1930s the Arars and the Ahmadiyyas became involved in a vicious internecine dispute 
over the most effective way to challenge the autocratic rule of the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, the 
great majority of whose subjects were Muslims. Whilst the Arars – whose principal source of support 
lay in the Potohar region of Punjab – actively supported a peasant uprising in that part of Kashmir 
which lies to the south of the Pir Panjal mountains (which immediately adjoins the Potohar plateau), 
much to the alarm of the British authorities, the Ahmadiyyas provided equally active support for 
protests articulated by elite Muslim leadership in Srinagar.  
When the Maharaja managed to restore order (with extensive British assistance), the Arars and the 
Ahmadiyyas blamed each other for the failure of the enterprise. In doing so the Arars took the 
opportunity to suggest that the Ahmadiyyas had deliberately undermined their efforts on two grounds: 
firstly that they were in the pay of the British authorities, and secondly that they were not even 
Muslims at all, but mere kaffirs. In the immediate post-independence period the Arar movement 
transformed itself into the Khatme-Nabuwaat, and since then the movement has gone from strength to 
strength as a vehicle for neo-fundamentalist mobilisation. 
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1.4. The consequences of being formally identified as not-Muslims 
Since then the Ahmadis have found themselves ever increasingly marginalised, no less by 
Islamist fanatics looking for scapegoats than by the authorities themselves. A particularly clear 
indication of the contradictions which they have encountered faced can be found in a much-
quoted ruling by Supreme Court Justice Abdul Qadeer Arshad, who held that although religious 
freedom was guaranteed in Pakistan, Ahmadis must nevertheless “never desecrate or defile the 
pious personage of any other religion including Islam, nor should they use their exclusive 
epithets, descriptions and titles, and also avoid using exclusive names likes mosques, and 
practices like Azan so that the people are not misled or deceived as regard to the faith…”  
This effectively placed the Ahmadis in a quite impossible double bind, since their everyday 
religious practices – given that they identified themselves as Muslims – required them to do 
precisely those things which this ruling deemed unacceptable. Hence simply by being even a 
mildly pious Ahmadi – by, for example reciting the shahada, the Islamic statement of faith in 
public – necessarily fell foul of Mr. Justice Choudhry’s strictures. It followed that any 
practicing Ahmadi was by definition wide open to finding himself being charged with a very 
serious criminal offence. 
The suggestion that the followers of Ghulam Ahmad Mirza are not, and cannot legitimately 
describe themselves as Muslims has likewise been taken up by Pakistan’s educational 
authorities. Hence the textbooks dealing with Islamiyyat – a compulsory subject at all levels 
in the Pakistani educational system – explicitly identify the movement as having rejected the 
finality of the Prophet Mohammed, and hence as having rejected one of the most fundamental 
tenets of Islamic theology. In other words the tenets of the Khatme-Nabuwaat are explicitly 
underlined by the educational system, so much so that any challenge to the arguments on this 
score set out in Islamiyyat textbooks are now popularly regarded not just as blasphemously 
heretical, but as a traitorous betrayal of Pakistan’s national integrity.  
By no means everyone is fooled by such arguments, however. As Pakistan’s educational 
system has succumbed to a rising tide of authoritarian and anti-intellectual neo-
fundamentalism, an ever increasing number of more thoughtful students have begun to think 
outside the box, and to explore the contents of the forbidden fruit on the far side of the fence. 
This is not difficult to do in the Ahmadi case, since the movement now has a large and 
comparatively wealthy following outside Pakistan. From there it runs a global satellite-based 
TV service, which can readily be watched in Pakistan, as well as producing extensive 
literature setting out views of a kind which can readily be described as ‘moderate Islam’.  To 
disaffected and intellectually starved young Pakistani students who come across such 
material, the teachings of Ahmadiyya movement are frequently read as a breath of fresh air – 
leading them readily to accept the invitation to join in. Whilst all who do so have little 
alternative but to pursue their new-found interests surreptitiously, such developments – which 
are becoming increasingly widespread – have begun to precipitate steadily rising levels of 
alarm amongst those holding more ‘orthodox’ opinions.  
 
2. Subsequent Developments  
2.1. The settlement in Rabwah 
Prior to partition, the headquarters of the Ahmadiyya movement had been in the East Punjab 
town of Qadian, Ghulam Mohammed’s birthplace. However when Qadian was swallowed up 
by India in 1947, Ghulam Mohammed’s successor and his followers were forced to flee. 
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They soon set up an alternative settlement in District Jhang on the far side of the newly 
established border, which they named Rabwah (‘high ground’ in qur’anic Arabic). In its early 
years Rabwah became a thriving town, not least because of the strength of the movement’s 
transnational linkages. Over the years a substantial number of Ahmadis migrated overseas, 
most particularly to Western Europe and North America, partly in pursuit of professional 
careers, but also as proselytising Islamic missionaries. In so doing they have attracted a large 
number of non-Pakistani converts, especially in West Africa.  
But although the Ahmadiyyas consequently have a large transnational presence – the 
movement’s satellite TV broadcasts (which are originated in North America) can be picked 
up in most parts of the world – in no way does Rabwah have any kind of sovereign status: 
instead it is still firmly located within, and indeed subordinated to, Pakistan’s established 
socio-political order. Not only has the town been renamed Chenab Nagar by the authorities, 
but it also falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the nearby Tehsil headquarters in 
Chiniot. Nor do the town’s Ahmadi inhabitants have any kind of administrative autonomy: as 
the President of the Rabwah Human Rights Committee has indicated that all the most 
significant administrative offices in the town are headed up by either Shi’a or Sunni Muslims.  
It is also worth noting that although Rabwah is regularly identified as the ‘headquarters’ of 
the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, and that the town is exceptional in the sense that 
Ahmadis form make up a substantial proportion of the local population, the great majority of 
Pakistan’s Ahmadi population live elsewhere, either in the villages in which conversion took 
place during the early years of twentieth century, or in the cities of Lahore, Faisalabad, 
Multan and Karachi. Moreover as hostility to the movement became steadily more 
institutionalised, Rabwah lost its initial position of administrative autonomy, and the town 
soon begun to haemorrhage the best and brightest members of its population. Those who still 
remain find themselves a focus of harassment, which in recent years has largely, although not 
exclusively been articulated through a reinvigorated khatme-Nabuwaat movement. 
2.2. The origins of the rise of neo-fundamentalism 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American support for the resultant anti-
communist jihad, together with matched Saudi financial sponsorship, channelled largely 
through the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, a semi-autonomous branch of the Pakistani 
Army) for guerrilla operations in both Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir, there has been a 
significant resurgence of support for neo-fundamentalist Islamist movements in many parts of 
Pakistan. The central reason for this is that majority of those who went off to fight these twin 
jihads were drawn from madrasseh (seminaries) run by the hard-line Deobandi movement, 
which were largely funded by donations from Saudi Arabia, and their interests protected by 
senior officers in the ISI. It was from precisely these seminaries that the Taliban movement 
emerged.  
But although the ISI – which operated largely autonomously of the formally constituted 
Pakistani government – expected that the impact of the shock-troops emerging from the 
seminaries, together with the ‘ulema who trained them would largely be felt across the border 
in Afghanistan and India, there was no way in which their influence could be so confined. 
Although still a very small minority, these well armed thugs, together with the ‘ulema who 
provided them with their ideological inspiration, also began to have an increasing impact 
within Pakistan itself. The result was the emergence of a series of groups of militant 
extremists such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Toiba, Jaish-Mohammedi – and a newly    
revived manifestation of the Khatme Nabuwaat – all of whom were as eager to pursue their 
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objectives by violent means within Pakistan as they were across the border in Afghanistan 
and Kashmir.  
Pakistan’s weak civilian governments – led on a box-and-cox basis by Benazir Bhutto and 
Nawaz Sharif – were largely unable to contain the increasingly violent activities of these 
movements, which is one of the reasons why General Musharraf’s military coup in 1999 was 
greeted with a sigh of relief by large sections of the population. But although General 
Musharraf fairly soon proscribed the most violent of these movements (although not the 
Khatme Nabuwaat) he has not been able to eliminate them. A few of their leading members 
may have been incarcerated, but vast majority of their foot-soldiers still remain at large, and 
regularly implement major atrocities. 
2.3. The dilemma currently faced by the Pakistani authorities 
There can be little doubt that ‘internal terrorism’ of this kind causes great concern to General 
(and now President) Musharraf and many of his immediate advisors, both because it disturbs 
the social order, and because they are personally opposed to most aspects of the 
fundamentalist ideologies which inspire those who carry out such atrocities – some of which 
have been directed at the President himself. However in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, 
Musharraf has found himself unable to make much more than symbolic gestures of disgust 
towards their activities and supporting ideologies. Whilst the President’s decision to back the 
American invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 mat have been strategically sensible, it was one to  
which the vast majority of the population were bitterly hostile. Hence when elections were 
held later that years – as was essential if Musharraf was to establish the legitimacy of his 
regime – the MMA, a rag-tag coalition of Islamist parties – received sufficient votes to hold a 
balance of power in the new Parliament. It followed that if President Musharraf was to keep 
his fledgling democracy afloat, he could do nothing which would upset the MMA. Otherwise 
the whole fragile edifice which he has so carefully constructed would in all probability 
collapse like a pack of cards. Hence whilst General Musharraf regularly makes speeches 
expressing his commitment to open liberal democracy and his intense hostility to most 
aspects of the neo-fundamentalists’ agenda, especially when addressing international 
audiences, he is largely unable to implement those policies in practice.  
This state of affairs is firmly underlined in the widely respected International Crisis Group’s 
report on the State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, published in April 2005.3 The Executive 
Summary of the report opens by noting: 
Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence of state policies of 
Islamisation and marginalisation of secular democratic forces. Co-option and 
patronage of religious parties by successive military governments have brought 
Pakistan to a point where religious extremism threatens to erode the foundations of 
the state and society. As President Pervez Musharraf is praised by the international 
community for his role in the war against terrorism, the frequency and viciousness of 
sectarian terrorism continues to increase in his country. Instead of empowering 
liberal, democratic voices, the government has co-opted the religious right and 
continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition.  
In the body of the text the Report went on to note  
                                                 
3  The International Crisis Group operates autonomously, but receives its finance from numerous 
Governments. In the case of the UK, contributors include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
the Department for International Development.  
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Sectarian terrorists in Pakistan are thriving in an atmosphere of religious intolerance 
for which its military government is largely to blame. General Musharraf has 
repeatedly pledged that he would eradicate religious extremism and sectarianism 
and transform Pakistan into a moderate Muslim state. In the interests of retaining 
power, he has done the opposite.  
Instead of empowering liberal, democratic voices, the government has co-opted the 
religious right and continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition. By depriving 
democratic forces of an even playing field and continuing to ignore the need for state 
policies that would encourage and indeed reflect the country's religious diversity, the 
government has allowed religious extremist organisations and jihadi groups, and the 
madrasas that provide them an endless stream of recruits, to flourish. It has failed to 
protect a vulnerable judiciary and equip its law-enforcing agencies with the tools they 
need to eliminate sectarian terrorism. (page 29) 
2.4. The resurgence of the Khatme Nabuwaat movement 
All this has provided fertile ground for the resurgence of the Khatme Nabuwaat movement. 
The neo-fundamentalist Islamist groups which emerged during the 1990s, and whose 
popularity gained a further boost following the American invasion of Afghanistan in the 
aftermath of 9/11, fell into two broad categories: firstly those who sought to wage war on 
those whom the identified as Islam’s enemies without, the Russians, the Hindus, and above 
all the Americans; and secondly those who specialised in seeking to extirpate those groups 
whom they regarded as Islam’s ‘enemies within’. Amongst the latter two groups proved to be 
particularly significant, most especially in terms of the mayhem they have achieved. The 
Sipah-i-Sahaba, who initially targeted Christians and then moved on to mount equally 
homicidal attacks on Shi’a Muslims (whom they likewise identified as kaffir), and the 
Khatme-Nabuwaat movement, whose sole target was the Ahmadiyyas. 
Whilst the Sipah-i-Sahaba swiftly moved towards out and out terrorism, such that bombing 
Churches and Mosques became their tactic of choice, members of the Khatme-Nabuwaat 
movement has for the most part restricted itself to a more ‘legalistic’ approach. Hence they 
began to specialise in launching criminal complaints against leading members of local 
Ahmadi communities. This was relatively easy to do, since Section 295 provided a ready 
basis on which to register an FIR against any Ahmadi who made any kind of public 
manifestation of their religious commitment. The result patterns of harassment continue to this 
day. 
To be sure the Khatme-Nabuwaat tend to be rather less violent than their Sipah-i-Sahaba 
counterparts, since the most recent murder reported in the press appears to be that of Brigadier 
Iftikar Ahmed, who was gunned down in broad daylight by three assailants in his house in 
Rawalpindi cantonment in July 2003. Nevertheless legal harassment continues: as the BBC 
reported on 30th November 2004, an Ahmadi convert named Iqbal Ahmed was arraigned under 
Section 295 before the District Court in Chiniot, under whose jurisdiction Rabwah falls; having 
been found guilty, he was sentenced to Life Imprisonment.4  It is also worth noting that the 
recent Crisis Group report indicates that the KN has now located its national headquarters in 
Chiniot:  
Sipah-i-Sahaba reinforces and complements the Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatme 
Nabuwaat (Movement to Protect Finality of Prophethood), based in Chiniot, Jhang's 
neighbouring town. Chiniot is also close to Rabwah, the Ahmadi religious centre and 
a frequent target of Sunni, particularly SSP-led, violence. (page 15) 
                                                 
4   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4055723.stm  
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2.5. The character of the Khatme-Nabuwaat threat to the Ahmadiyyas in contemporary 
Pakistan 
Nevertheless it is worth noting that the Khatme-Nabuwaat made no attempt to target all 
Ahmadis, wherever they were to be found in Pakistan. Rather they preferred to focus on those 
who had some kind of public profile, and/or those who were active in student affairs. (most 
members of the khatme-Nabuwaat’s hit-squads are young men of student age). This is 
significant both because Ahmadis are committed to da’wa (‘spreading the word’ or as the legal 
literature often puts it, ‘preaching’), and because many students from non-Ahmadi backgrounds 
have become thoroughly disillusioned with the mindlessly thuggish tactics of the neo-
fundamentalists. On the one hand Ahmadi students frequently find a ready audience when they 
share their careful and considered approach to Islam with interested non-Ahmadi class-fellows; 
and on the other it is becoming increasingly frequent for young people who have become 
disillusioned with mindless authoritarianism neo-fundamentalist teachings to look for potential 
alternatives. Should they stumble their way onto an Ahmadi website in amongst the forest of 
sites maintained by the khatme-Nabuwaat opponents, they may well find themselves drawn into 
the movement through cyber-space.  
Such developments cause a great alarm amongst supporters of the khatme-Nabuwaat. If the 
prospect of Ahmadis conducting da’wa appears, from their perspective, to be an outrageous 
challenge to the true faith, the prospect of good Muslims committing apostasy seems quite 
preposterous, and demands the strongest possible counter-measures. However the Maulvis who 
maintain a tight hold over khatme-Nabuwaat activities for the most part take care to avoid the 
simplistic ‘kill the kaffirs’ position adopted by their more violent counterparts, for just as they 
did way back in 1953 their ultimate target still appears to be the ‘authorities who permit unbelief 
to persist in their midst’, rather than just the ‘unbelievers’ themselves. Hence the fact that the 
FIRs which they regularly register against Ahmadis relatively rarely make much progress 
through the courts suits their persecutors down to the ground.  
On the one hand these delays enable them to argue – just as they did in 1953 – that the 
authorities secretly support the unbelievers; and on the other the very fact a charge has been 
registered provides endless opportunity to tie their victims up in court appearances, and in 
doing so whip up popular hostility towards them. Sometimes the crowds of protestors become 
so excited that they cause the victim’s death. More usually, however, they take the line of 
least resistance and flee. However even that is by no means always an effective solution. The 
khatme-Nabuwaat is an organisation with branches in all parts of Pakistan, and since their 
victims normally flee to take shelter with relatives, it appears that members of a branch in any 
one neighbourhood very often manage to establish the destination to which their victim is 
most likely to flee. This seems likely to be the most reasonable explanation as to why it is 
that those Ahmadis who flee for safety from one part of Pakistan to another are so often – 
although by no means always – picked up, and picked upon, by the local khatme-Nabuwaat 
group so soon after their arrival.  
3. The Legal Foundations of the so-called Blasphemy Laws 
Besides setting out a devastating critique of the administration of justice in contemporary 
Pakistan, the International Crisis Group’s report entitled Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, 
published in October 2008 also includes an illuminating legally-grounded commentary on the 
way in which additional clauses were inserted into sections to 295 and 298 of the Pakistan 
Penal Code to produce what are currently popularly identified as the blasphemy laws, 
together with a commentary on the impact which they have had on a variety of minority 
 9
communities, including the Ahmadis. The analysis set forward is so detailed and illuminating 
that it is worth quoting in full:  
 
Ill. ISLAMISING THE LEGAL SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONALISED DISCRIMINATION  
A. THE BLASPHEMY LAW  
The Pakistan Penal Code is based on colonial India's Penal Code of 1862, which has 
however been amended several times since 1947. Pakistan's blasphemy law might, for 
instance, appear to be based on the British colonial law that prohibits the denigration of 
religion, but the Pakistani version is significantly different. Section 295A in the PPC that 
addresses religion is certainly inherited from the Indian Penal Code. Prohibiting 
"deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by 
insulting its religion or religious beliefs", it is not in itself discriminatory and is generally 
consistent with international standards on the defamation of religion. The Zia-ul-Haq 
regime's amendments, however, placed special emphasis on the protection of Muslims; 
called for harsher punishments for offences against Islam; and required trials under 
Section 295 to be presided over by a Muslim judge. Said a Karachi-based human rights 
lawyer and Supreme Court advocate: "It is these provisions that make the PPC a 
discriminatory system".  
They include:  
Section 295B (1982): Calls for life imprisonment for anyone who ''wilfully defiles, 
damages or desecrates a copy of the holy Qu'raan ... or uses it in any derogatory 
manner". It allows for such a person to be arrested without a warrant.  
Section 295C (1986): Imposes the death penalty, or a life sentence, on anyone who, 
"by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, 
innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad".  
The blasphemy law's vague language makes no reference to a potential offender's state 
of mind or intention, exacerbating its impact and inviting widespread abuse and "the 
harassment and persecution of minorities in Pakistan"." It effectively delegates authority 
to private citizens and public officials to enforce social biases. Radical Sunni outfits in 
particular have exploited the law to target religious and sectarian minorities, using trials 
for religious offences as occasions to rally their base. In May 1994, for example, a group 
of clerics used a blasphemy hearing against two Christians in the Lahore High Court as a 
stage for public calls for Pakistan's "Talibanisation"."  
Since 1991, blasphemy cases carry a mandatory death penalty. Although such a 
sentence has never been carried out, the blasphemy law remains, in the words of an 
analyst, "a lethal weapon in the hands of religious extremists'?" and "the handiest 
instrument for mullahs to persecute rivals, particularly members of the Christian 
community [as well as] liberals". It also encourages violence.  
In July 2002, an inmate belonging to the radical Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) murdered a 
scholar convicted of blasphemy by a Lahore district court." In August 2003, a Christian 
was arrested under Section 295 for littering near a mosque in Lahore. A police officer 
killed the man while he was in custody out of a sense of "religious duty"."  
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Blasphemy cases are not treated as typical criminal trials. LA. Rehman, director of the 
independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), emphasised:  
"In blasphemy cases involving minorities, lower courts invariably convict the accused. 
They cannot take the risk of acquitting the person"." Lahore's police chief admits that 
religious groups pressure the police into lodging charges under the blasphemy law." 
Such groups also attack and intimidate defence lawyers, making it difficult for the 
accused to get legal representation. "I cannot dare to file a petition in court that this is a 
discriminatory provision of law", said a Supreme Court advocate and human rights 
lawyer. "Even as a teacher of law, I was hesitant to talk about the blasphemy law, 
because of past incidents when students who belong to religious parties have filed 
blasphemy cases against such professors"." Intimidation also extends to the higher 
judiciary; most notably, in October 1997, a Lahore High Court judge who had acquitted a 
teenaged boy of blasphemy was shot dead in his chambers.  
Often defendants in blasphemy cases request a transfer of their case to another 
jurisdiction, which the law permits if a case is not heard on time or if the circumstances 
do not allow for a fair hearing." The superior courts have also limited the impact of the 
blasphemy law, overturning subordinate court verdicts or dismissing cases for lack of 
evidence." However, so long as the law remains on the books, Pakistani citizens, and 
minorities in particular, will be vulnerable to its abuse.  
In 2000, shortly after seizing power, Musharraf promised to amend the blasphemy law to 
allow only senior district officials to register blasphemy cases but soon withdrew the 
proposed change under pressure from the religious lobby. In 2005, parliament passed a 
law requiring that a senior police official investigate a blasphemy accusation before a 
complaint was filed in the courts. Seldom implemented, the law has not led to a 
significant reduction in blasphemy charges." Well-off complainants who are seeking to 
use the blasphemy law in financial or property disputes can easily skirt the requirement: 
"All it takes is a well placed bribe to get around this safeguard"."  
In May 2007 Musharraf’s PML-Q government rejected a private member bill by a ruling 
party parliamentarian, calling for changes that would make the blasphemy law less 
discriminatory. The parliamentary affairs minister was quoted as saying: "Islam is our 
religion and such bills hurt our feelings. This is not a secular state but [the] Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan","  
In a major recent judgment, the Lahore High Court overturned a blasphemy conviction by 
allowing the defendant to recite the first Kalima as evidence of his innocence, thereby 
shifting the burden of evidence to the prosecution, as required by law." A legal analyst 
argued: "This decision as an operating precedent makes it difficult for a conviction to be 
obtained in the lower courts without a strict evidentiary standard."  
B. TARGETING AHMADIS  
Pakistan's anti-Ahmadi laws merit special attention because of their link with the 
sectarian conflict and violence that remains the primary source of terrorism in the 
country. Right-wing religious groups began demanding the Ahmadi seer" be declared a 
nonMuslim minority shortly after independence in 1947. In 1953, anti-Ahmadi riots led to 
the imposition of martial law in Lahore, Punjab's provincial capital, the fall of the 
provincial government and eventually the fall of the central government. A court of 
inquiry examining the disturbances issued a report stating that there was no consensus 
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amongst the ulema" on the definition of "Muslim", and therefore any Muslim individual or 
sect was entitled to its own interpretation of the religion."  
Ahmadis were legally recognised as Muslims until 1974 when, capitulating to the 
religious lobby, following Jamaat-i-Islami-led street demonstrations in Punjab, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto's government passed a constitutional amendment that officially excommunicated 
Ahmadis. In 1984, to appease orthodox Sunnis, his main constituency, General Zia-ul-
Haq further institutionalised Ahmadi segregation through amendments to the Penal 
Code. The Supreme Court dismissed a constitutional petition against these 
amendments, as did the Federal Shariat Court. The provisions include:  
Section 298-B, which prohibits:  
1. Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori'" group (who call themselves 
Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written or by visible 
representation:  
a) refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of 
the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him-PBUH), as Ameer-ul-
Mumineen [leader of the faithful], Khalifa-tul-Mumineen [caliph of the faithful], 
Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen [caliph of the Muslims], Sahaabi or Razi Allah Anho 
[companions of the Prophet];  
b) refers to or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the holy Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH), as Ummul-Mumineen [Mother of the Faithful, a title 
reserved for the Prophet's wives];  
c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family 
(Ahle-bait) of the holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as Ahlebait [family of the 
Prophet]; or refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid 
(mosque); shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to [a] fine.  
2. Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahori group, (who call themselves Ahmadis or 
by any other names), who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representations, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as 
Azan [call to prayer] or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may be extended to three years 
and shall also be liable to [ a] fine.  
Section 298-C, which prohibits:  
Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis 
or any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or 
refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to 
accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in 
any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years 
and shall also be liable to fine [crimes under this section are non-bailable].   
Ahmadis must either renounce their beliefs to be declared Muslim, or be declared non-
Muslim. Muslims must officially declare that they do not recognise the Ahmadi community as 
Muslim before they can obtain a Pakistani passport. In 2004 the government introduced new 
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machine-readable passports that, unlike earlier ones, did not include a religion column. 
However, after hard-line clerics accused Musharraf of secularising the country, the 
government restored the religious column. In June 2007, the Election Commission of 
Pakistan issued separate electoral lists for the Ahmadi community for the February 2008 
elections despite government commitments to end separate electorates.  
Anti-Ahmadi laws have deepened sectarian fault lines, with the Sunni extremist Sipah-i-
Sahaba, for instance, demanding that the Shia sect be also declared non-Muslim. This 
discriminatory legislation has also encouraged vigilantism and violence.  
As with the blasphemy law, the vague language of Section 298 has resulted in a flood of 
cases, mostly trivial, against Ahmadis. For example, in 1989 Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, an 
Ahmadi, was arrested for distributing a pamphlet and, while in prison, was seen saying his 
prayers by a political opponent, who then filed a criminal case against him for posing as a 
Muslim. The case took eleven years, and a judicial magistrate in Hyderabad finally found 
Ahmad guilty under Section 298. In his judgment, the magistrate acknowledged that the 
constitution gives every citizen the right to practice his or her faith. However, since Ahmad 
had faced the Kaaba." while offering his prayers, "he posed himself as Muslim and injured 
the feeling of thoughts and the individual beliefs of citizens cannot be allowed to be 
interfered with". It further stated:  
"Islamist jurists are unanimous on the point that except for Sallat [prayer] and Zakat 
[alms] no other obligation stipulated by Islam can be enforced by the state". The 
Court also reinforced the 1954 opinion of the court of inquiry that the ulema "had no 
unanimity before the Court of Inquiry on the definition of 'Muslim', because, everyone 
being a Muslim has his own interpretation of Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, [a state 
official] under the Hisba Bill, cannot be empowered to determine in his discretion 
whether any act is consistent with Islamic moral values and etiquettes or not".   
The same court, however, failed to declare the blasphemy laws, anti-Ahmadi legislation or 
the anti-women Hudood Ordinances unconstitutional.  
4. Sectarian conflicts and the steadily rising political impact of neo-fundamentalism 
4.1. Escalation in the scale of neo-fundamentalist violence 
The ICG report cited above is one of a long succession of reports published by the 
organisation during the course of the past decade which effectively serve to track post 9/11 
political developments in Pakistan. In doing so they have consequently highlighted the way in 
which neo-fundamentalist groups have become steadily more politically influential over time, 
partly as a result of covert assistance from the ISI (The Pakistan army’s equivalent to the 
CIA), partly as a result of the close links with the Taliban in Afghanistan and jihadi 
initiatives in Kashmir, together with the tendency of the authorities’ marked preference for 
trying to appease their demands in the aftermath of the increasingly audacious in-country 
terrorist ‘spectaculars’, rather than actively confronting them. 
 
In a report entitled Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, published in December 
2006, the ICG went on to describe how supporters of the Afghan Taliban (many of whom 
were of Pakistani origin) who had retreated (along with Osama bin Laden) fled across the 
border into neighbouring Districts along the Pakistani border had effectively managed to set 
up an alternative ‘Islamic’ administration of their own in many parts of the Federally 
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Administered Tribal Areas, so much so that the authors of the report included a chapter 
entitled ‘The Talibanisation of Pakistan.’ They were prescient in so doing: soon after the 
report was published disparate jihadi groups who have wrested control from properly 
constituted authorities in the greater part of FATA, and who also have an extensive following 
in much of the rest of Pakistan came together under a single umbrella organisation, the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan.  
 
The roots and consequences of these developments – and most especially the ways in which 
they have begun to spread beyond FATA to precipitate rising waves of neo-fundamentalist 
violence across the length and breadth of Pakistan are discussed in chilling detail in a recently 
published book by Rashid Ahmed, entitled Descent into Chaos: How the War against 
extremism is currently being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (Allen Lane: the 
Penguin Press, 2008). As Rashid Ahmed notes in his conclusion 
 
In 2007 there were 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan, which killed 419 security 
officials and 217 civilians, compared to just 6 such attacks the previous year. Despite 
this tenfold increase in suicide bombings, the regime had failed to track down a 
single culprit.' 
 
In 2008 there has been no let-up in these developments. The bombers are becoming 
increasingly audacious, and although we are still little more than half way through the year, 
the number of those who have so far lost their lives on this basis is already comfortably in 
excess of those who met their end in this way in 2008. Indeed such is the scale of violence 
that only the more outrageous incidents are now reported in the press.  
 
The opening paragraph of the ICG’s report on, Reforming Pakistan’s Police published in July 
2008, takes up the same theme: 
 
After decades of misuse and neglect, Pakistan’s police force is incapable of 
combating crime, upholding the law or protecting citizens and the state against 
militant violence. With an elected government taking over power after more than 
eight years of military rule, the importance of reforming this dysfunctional force has 
assumed new importance. Elected representatives will be held accountable if citizens 
continue to see the police, the public face of government, as brutal and corrupt. 
 
The police remain a political pawn, with transfers and promotions used to reward 
those willing to follow orders, no matter how illegal, and to punish the few 
professional officers who dared to challenge their military masters. The new civilian 
government has inherited a police force with a well-deserved reputation for 
corruption, high-handedness and abuse of human rights, which served the military 
well for over eight years, suppressing Musharraf’s civilian opposition and more than 
willing to accept any task – from extrajudicial killings and torture to rigging elections. 
With public confidence in the police at an all-time low, reform will be difficult and 
require time, patience and resources, yet it is a task the new governments at the 
centre and in the provinces will ignore at their peril, as militant violence reaches new 
heights. 
 
It is hardly surprising that this under-staffed, ill-equipped, deeply politicized, and 
pervasively corrupt force has failed to counter the growing extremist menace that is 




A further ICG report entitled Pakistan: the Jihadi Challenge, dated 13th March 2009 further 
underlined the unwillingness, and indeed the inability, of Pakistan’s properly constituted 
authorities to intervene on behalf of members of religious minorities when they found 
themselves targeted by rabble-rousing mobs whipped up by the religious right. Strikingly 
enough, the report makes scant reference to attacks on members of either the Christian or the 
Ahmadi minorities in its analysis of the Pakistani jihadis internal targets: instead it focuses on 
a much more alarming phenomenon: Sunni neo-fundamentalists’ efforts to identify members 
of Pakistan’s much more substantial Shi’a population as blasphemers and infidels, whose 
consequences the report discusses at some length. With the wider issues in mind (for it goes 
without say that the Christian and Ahmadi issues have not diminished in the midst of all this, 
but have merely been turned into mere political molehills in comparison with the rapid 
appearance of a neighbouring mountain) the conclusions which the report reaches can only be 
described as chilling: 
The increased influence of radical Sunni groups, which remain the primary source of 
terrorism in Pakistan, and their links to international networks like al-Qaeda make 
them even more dangerous than before. Dismantling them must be the core of the 
government’s counterterrorism policy. However, the military’s patronage of regional 
jihadi groups like the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, also tacitly supported by some elements of 
the civil bureaucracy, is the primary impediment to sustained government action. 
 
Decades of military rule have also weakened Pakistan’s moderate and secular forces 
and emboldened the religious right. Even if the democratic transition continues 
uninterrupted, counter-terrorism will only be effective if it is not just robust but also 
accountable, based on identifying, arresting and ultimately convicting religious 
extremists in fair trials. Musharraf’s eight-year rule caused a general breakdown of 
governance, leaving state institutions like the police and the courts in disarray. 
Political interference from the military establishment has not only limited the police’s 
technical capabilities, but has more directly prevented consistent action against 
radical jihadi groups. The elected government must now vest significantly greater 
resources and authority in the IB, CIDs and FIA to enable these agencies to fulfil their 
mandate. 
 
To date there is no sign whatsoever that such initiatives have been put in place, or that 
there is any likelihood of their being implemented in the immediate future. 
5. The fall of the Musharraf regime and its consequences  
5.1.Politics 
The past year has seen tumultuous developments in Pakistan. Although democratic rule has 
nominally been restored in Pakistan as a consequence of the overwhelming popular demands 
that General Musharraf should resign from his position as President, his replacement Asif 
Zardari – who gained office on a wave of public sympathy in the aftermath of the 
assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto – is proving to be a weak and fickle occupant of the 
post. There are several reasons for this 
 Despite the fact that the PPP and its allies still have a threadbare majority in the 
National Assembly, the Zardari government no longer enjoys any kind of popular 
mandate, especially in the Punjab, Pakistan’s largest and richest province, 
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 As a result of years of neglect, let alone the impact of the global credit crunch, 
Pakistan’s economy is currently on its beam ends 
 Driven by poverty and disillusionment, as well as by almost universal hostility to the 
US presence in Afghanistan, and especially regular sallies by US airplanes into 
Pakistani airspace in hot pursuit of terrorists, and further reinforced by revisions in the 
school curriculum, there is a powerful bedrock if support for neo-fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam amongst the population at large.  
 As a result the Zardari government, and indeed the military (which remains to this day 
the major power behind the throne) continues to prevaricate as to how far it should 
crack down on, and how far it should seek a compromise with, the agenda of the 
religious right. 
 Hence despite the decision of the military to implement massive counter-insurgency 
operations in those where the writ of the authorities had ceased to run, it is by no 
means clear whether the underlying problems are being resolved. Once again the 
military has begun to make repeated announcements that the terrorist threat has been 
virtually eliminated; however most observers – including most of the two million 
inhabitants of the Swat valley who fled southwards for safety’s sake – are not greatly 
impressed by those claims.  
 As a result key aspects of the neo-fundamentalist agenda still attract widespread 
support on the grounds that they are protecting the integrity of Pakistan’s established 
order from the threat of heresies within (e.g. in the form of non-Sunni interpretations 
of Islam, such as the Shi’as and followers of the Ahmadiyya movement), as well as 
from even more the serious threats stemming from what are perceived as being 
Pakistan’s implacable enemies from without (India and the United States). 
At practical level the consequences of these developments were immediately apparent during 
the course of my recent short visit to Pakistan. Even though the area in which I based myself 
was well clear of the areas in which the authorities have lost administrative control, the lack 
of security felt by those with assets to protect was palpable. Armed private security guards 
were much in evidence, and there was much talk of the robberies and kidnaps, which the 
authorities appeared to be largely unable to contain. 
By chance I also ran into a clear example of just such a development when I made a brief 
visit to Pakistan in June 2009. 
5.2. My own experience of the looming power of neo-fundamentalism 
Although I asked my local informants about the position in which the Ahmadiyyas currently 
find themselves in Pakistan during the course of my recent brief visit, I did not receive 
anything in the way of a significant response. However they bubbling over to tell me another 
very recent incident, involving  the experiences of a follower of Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, yet 
another religious reformer in a similar mould to Ghulam Ahmed Mirza, the founder of the 
Ahmadiyya movement. Born in 1904 in Gurdaspur, just across the border in what is now 
India, Pervaiz was inspired by the teachings of the Sufi Chistiyya sect, and in the course of an 
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extended commentary on the Qur’an and the Hadith he was deeply critical of the theological 
stance taken by the neo-fundamentalist movements which began to emerge around the time 
of Independence, and most especially of those developed by the Arars and the Jamaat-i-
Islam. Ghulam Ahmed Pervez’ followers – who can now be found in smallish numbers 
across the length and breadth of Pakistan – currently identify themselves as devotees of Tolu-
e-Islam, but are popularly identified as Pervaizis.  
The incident in question took place just over a fortnight ago in Jhelum, a major town 
approximately seventy miles to the South East of Islamabad. Approximately six months a 
local follower of Ghulam Ahmed Pervez had published an article supporting the Master’s 
teaching, and in doing so had articulated an interpretation of the Islamic tradition which 
leading local mullahs regarded as blasphemous, and on that basis successfully lodged and 
FIR against him under Section 298c PPC. The ‘blasphemer’ was taken into custody, partly 
for his own protection, and after several adjournments the case had come before the District 
Judge. However the complainants were well aware that the District Judge had little sympathy 
with their cause. Hence in their Friday sermons immediately before the case was to be heard, 
they urged their followers to attend the court to make their position crystal clear.  
But whilst a large crowd assembled outside the court on the day on which the trial was due to 
take place, the Judge once again adjourned the case, on the grounds that the prosecution had 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to substantiate their case. He also decided to remand the 
accused in custody, not least for his own protection. When news of his decision reached the 
crowd outside, they promptly attacked the District Court, and trashed the interior of many of 
the courts, before moving on to make an assault – which seems to have been repulsed – on 
the local prison.  
However none of this was reported in the either the local or the National Newspapers whilst I 
was in Pakistan,  although I have come across a brief reference to the event in the on-line 
version of the Friday Times, which contained the following report, quoting an Urdu language 
newspaper:  
 
Rage against blasphemers  
Reported in Jinnah hundreds of protesters gathered at Sessions Court in Jhelum when 
the publishers of blasphemy were brought to the court but were given another date 
without hearing. The protesters entered the court and broke all furniture. They grabbed 
guns from the guards and beat up everyone in sight. The district jail doors were thrown 
down and much firing in the air was also resorted to by the protesters. They vowed to 
return to the courts to wreak more havoc before going away. Jhelum lawyers announced 
strike against the religious parties that had organised the protest.  
How this issue – where the charges against the accused appear to be virtually identical with 
those directed at Ahmadis whom the neo-fundamentalists decide to target – will ultimately be 
resolved remains to be seen. The only move I am aware of so far is that the District Judge – 
with whom I had an opportunity to shake hands but not to converse – has been relocated to a 
similar post in relatively remote District Attock.  
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5.3. A massacre in Islamabad 
On 1st June 2010 a violent attack on two Ahmadiyya mosques in Lahore hit the headline. 
Human Rights watch reported the incident thus: 
 
On May 28, 2010, extremist Islamist militants attacked two Ahmadiyya mosques in 
the central Pakistani city of Lahore with guns, grenades, and suicide bombs, killing 
94 people and injuring well over a hundred. Twenty-seven people were killed at the 
Baitul Nur Mosque in the Model Town area of Lahore; 67 were killed at the Darul Zikr 
mosque in the suburb of Garhi Shahu. The Punjabi Taliban, a local affiliate of the 
Pakistani Taliban, called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility. 
On the night of May 31, unidentified gunmen attacked the Intensive Care Unit of 
Lahore’s Jinnah Hospital, where victims and one of the alleged attackers in Friday's 
attacks were under treatment, sparking a shootout in which at least a further 12 
people, mostly police officers and hospital staff, were killed. The assailants 
succeeded in escaping.  
“The mosque attacks and the subsequent attack on the hospital, amid rising 
sectarian violence, underscore the vulnerability of the Ahmadi community,” said Ali 
Dayan Hasan, senior South Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The 
government’s failure to address religious persecution by Islamist groups effectively 
enables such atrocities.”  Human Rights Watch called on Pakistan's government to 
immediately introduce legislation in parliament to repeal laws discriminating against 
religious minorities such as the Ahmadis, including the penal statute that makes 
capital punishment mandatory for “blasphemy.” 
Human Rights Watch also urged the government of Punjab province, controlled by 
former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, to 
investigate and prosecute as appropriate campaigns of intimidation, threats, and 
violence against the Ahmadiyya community by Islamist groups such as the Sunni 
Tehrik, Tehrik-e-Tahafaz-e-Naomoos-e-Risalat, Khatm-e-Nabuwat and other groups 
acting under the Taliban’s umbrella. Leaders of these groups have frequently 
threatened to kill Ahmadis and attack the mosques where the killings took place. The 
anti-Ahmadiyya campaign has intensified in the past year, exemplified by the 
government allowing groups to place banners seeking the death of “Qadianis” (a 
derogatory term for Ahmadis) on the main thoroughfares of Lahore. 
The independent, non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
and Ahmadi community leaders told Human Rights Watch that they had repeatedly 
brought these threats to the notice of Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, the 
provincial government, and the police controlled by the provincial authorities, and that 
they had asked for enhanced security for Ahmadiyya mosques given their 
vulnerability to attack. However, Human Rights Watch research found that the 
provincial government failed to act on the evidence or to ensure meaningful security 
to the mosques. 
On May 30, Zaeem Qadri, advisor to Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, said in 
an interview on Dunya TV that the provincial government had failed to remove the 
threatening banners from the city’s thoroughfares in order to prevent “adverse 
reaction against the government” by the groups responsible. On the same day, a 
Taliban statement “congratulated” Pakistanis for the attacks, calling people from the 
Ahmadiyya and Shia communities “the enemies of Islam and common people” and 
urging Pakistanis to take the “initiative” and kill every such person “in range”.  
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“The Punjab government is either in denial about threats to Ahmadis and other 
minorities or is following a policy of willful discrimination,” said Hasan. “The Punjab 
government’s law enforcement authorities need to dispense with traditional 
prejudices and proactively protect heterodox communities like the Ahmadis, who now 
are in clear and serious danger from both the Taliban and sectarian militant groups 
historically supported by the state.” 
The persecution of the Ahmadiyya community is wholly legalized, even encouraged, 
by the Pakistani government. Pakistan’s penal code explicitly discriminates against 
religious minorities and targets Ahmadis in particular by prohibiting them from 
“indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.” Ahmadis are prohibited from declaring or 
propagating their faith publicly, building mosques or even referring to them as such, 
or making the call for Muslim prayer. 
Since the military government of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq unleashed a wave of persecution in 
the 1980s, violence against the Ahmadiyya community has never really ceased. 
Ahmadis continue to be killed and injured, and have their homes and businesses 
burned down in anti-Ahmadi attacks. The authorities continue to arrest, jail and 
charge Ahmadis for blasphemy and other offenses because of their religious beliefs. 
In several instances, the police have been complicit in harassment and the framing of 
false charges against Ahmadis, or stood by in the face of anti-Ahmadi violence. 
“Ahmadis unfortunately become easy targets in times of religious and political 
insecurity,” said Hasan. “The Pakistani government has emboldened the extremists 
by failing to take action. It needs to repeal the laws used to persecute Ahmadis, and 
it must prosecute those responsible for anti-Ahmadi intimidation and violence.” 
However, the government seldom brings charges against perpetrators of anti-Ahmadi 
violence and discrimination. Research by Human Rights Watch indicates that the 
police have failed to apprehend anyone implicated in such activity in the last several 
years. 
Since 2000, an estimated 400 Ahmadis have been formally charged in criminal 
cases, including blasphemy. Several have been convicted and face life imprisonment 
or death sentences pending appeal. The offenses charged included wearing an 
Islamic slogan on a shirt, planning to build an Ahmadi mosque in Lahore, and 
distributing Ahmadi literature in a public square. As a result, thousands of Ahmadis 
have fled Pakistan to seek asylum in countries including Canada and the United 
States. Human Rights Watch said that the Pakistani government continues to actively 
encourage legal and procedural discrimination against Ahmadis. For example, all 
Pakistani Muslim citizens applying for passports are obliged to sign a statement 
explicitly stating that they consider the founder of the Ahmadi community an 
“imposter” and consider Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. 
“Under Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law, virtually any public act of worship or devotion by 
an Ahmadi can be treated as a criminal offense,” said Hasan “Ahmadis could be 
sentenced to death for simply professing their faith. Pakistan’s continued use of its 
blasphemy law against Ahmadis and other religious minorities is despicable,” said 
Hasan. “As long as such laws remain on the books, Pakistan will remain a laboratory 
for abuse in the name of religion.”  
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/31/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis  
5.4. The current COIR for Pakistan 
It goes without saying that Governmental and non-Governmental agencies which seek to 
keep track of the experiences of religious minorities and to publish summary reports about 
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changing conditions take some time to register such developments, and that there is a further 
delay before those reports are picked up and republished by those responsible for updating 
the relevant COIRs. However the latest edition of the COIR for Pakistan substantially updates 
the observations of its predecessors: 
19.74  The PHRG Report 2010 also cited the attack on two Ahmadi mosques that 
occurred in May 2010, subsequent to the Mission’s visit of February 2010. 
The Report noted that: 
“The attack happened on Friday the 28th May 2010 when two large Ahmadi 
mosques were full of worshippers who had gathered for Friday-prayers. A 
well coordinated attack for which the responsibility was claimed by Tehrik-e-
Taliban, a hitherto unknown group but assumed to be a front for a sectarian 
organisation. Those who survived claimed that they heard the attackers 
shouting slogans of ‘Khatm-e-Nabuwaat’ and ‘kill all!’ Assailants entered the 
two mosques when the people were worshipping and in the end 85 people 
were killed and 150 injured.”  
19.75 The same source added that: 
“Representatives of the Ahmadiyya community told the Mission that the 
situation [of discrimination and violence] that currently exists cannot be 
attributed solely to extremist Mullahs who openly incite hatred and murder. It 
is also the state and political parties in power who are contributing to the 
discrimination against and persecution of Ahmadis.  
“The Mission met several state representatives, who without exception 
stated that state bodies were pressurised by religious extremists and that 
their own ability to reign in these parties was very limited. Representatives of 
the Islamabad Ahmadiyya community told the Mission that the reason for 
the failure of the government to take active steps against religious 
extremists was the fact that even the government was reliant on their 
support.  
“In Lahore the Mission was told by the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan that extremist Mullahs have developed a power base and now 
wield much influence because they are being encouraged by the 
government’s failure to act against them. While there is impunity there is no 
reason for these groups to stop. According to the Commission the 
government must make examples of extremist Mullahs. At the local level, 
the police are often reluctant to touch the Mullahs – again this reflects the 
failure of the government to deal with the situation at any level.”  
19.76 Thepersecution.org noted in its Annual Report 2009 that, between 1984 and 
31 December 2009, 105 Ahmadis were murdered for their faith, 11 of whom 
were killed during 2009. The same source noted that there were 120 
attempts of murder against Ahmadis in the same year. However the USSD 
Report 2006 provided different statistics on the numbers of Ahmadis killed, 
and observed that “The Ahmadi community claims that 171 of their 
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members have been killed since 1988 and that the government made little 
effort to bring those responsible for these and other acts of sectarian 
violence to justice or to provide protection for the targets or their families.”  
19.80 The Ahmadi community claimed that, as of June 2010, 42 Ahmadis faced 
criminal charges on religious laws or because of their faith. (USSD IRF 
Report 2010), compared to 88 between July 2007 and April 2009. (USSD 
IRF Report 2009)).  Another 25 Ahmadis faced charges under other sections 
of the penal code. (USSD IRF Report 2010)  
19.81  The USSD IRF Report 2010 added that: 
“According to Ahmadiyya leaders, at the end of the reporting period [July 
2009 to June 2010], six Ahmadis were in prison; one was facing life 
imprisonment, three were facing death sentences, and two were 
incarcerated on charges of preaching. The Ahmadiyya community claimed 
the arrests were groundless and based on the detainees' religious beliefs. 
Several criminal cases, ranging from killings to destruction of property, were 
filed against prominent members of the Ahmadiyya community during the 
reporting period. The cases remained unprosecuted, and the accused were 
allowed to post bail.”  
19.82 The PHRG Report 2010 stated that “The Mission was told by a number of 
witnesses that the judicial process moved very slowly in the case of 
Ahmadis and that discretionary remedies, like the granting of bail, were 
frequently refused to Ahmadis.”  
19.83 The same source cited a testimony from a witness whose husband, 
Mohammed Iqbal, had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment for 
blasphemy. “The Mission met and interviewed Mr Iqbal’s wife and son, who 
said that they had been the only Ahmadi family in their village and that the 
incident arose because the imam of the local mosque did not approve of Mr 
Iqbal coming to the mosque to talk to him.” Mr Iqbal appealed against his 
sentence but, five years on, the appeal is still pending. In the meantime, Mrs 
Iqbal moved to Rabwah, where it it was reported that she “feels safer”.  
19.84 In its Annual Report 2009, thepersecution.org, listed the number of criminal 
cases brought against Ahmadis from April 1984 to 31 December 2009. The 
list included 434 cases of Ahmadis booked for ‘posing as Muslims’, 719 
booked for preaching, and 295 charged under the “‘Blasphemy Law’, i.e. 
PPC 295-C.” The summary cited a total of 3,738 cases of Ahmadis being 
booked or charged on religious grounds. In addition, the report also noted 
that the entire population of Rabwah (more than 60,000 people) was booked 
under 298-C of the Penal Code on 8 June 2008. The USSD IRF Report 
2009 also noted that “... police charged the entire Ahmadi populations in 
Rabwah and Kotli with blasphemy in June 2008 for celebrating 100 years of 
Caliph-ship and constructing a mosque for the community.”  
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6. Conclusion: The current plight of the Pakistan’s marginalised ‘kaffir’ minorities  
Over the years Pakistan has become a steadily more violent society, partly as a result of the 
weakening legitimacy (and hence the authority) of successive government regimes, and partly 
as a result of the ever-rising force of increasingly well-armed and audacious neo-
fundamentalist activism. Moreover as a result of their growing confidence the neo-
fundamentalists have progressively raised their sights: whilst the initially confined their 
targets to marginal groups such as the Ahmadis and the Christians, in the 1990s and the early 
years of the new millennium they moved on to attack Shi’as and Sufis. More recently still 
neo-fundamentalists have begun to engage in ‘spectaculars’, such as the attack on the 
Christian Colony at Sangla Hill on 1st August 2009, when a mob set forty houses ablaze with 
the result that at least seven of their occupants were burnt alive, followed by the even more 
audacious attack on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore 28th May 2010 whilst the congregation 
were saying their Friday prayers, as a result of which 85 people were killed and 150 injured. 
Since then the militants has stepped up their campaign still further, as when the Governor of 
Punjab, Salman Tasseer, was shot down in broad daylight on 4th January 2011 by one of his 
military bodyguards to great popular acclaim – since the assassin made it quite clear that his 
motivation for doing so was in retribution for his ungodly support for the repeal of the 
blasphemy law. Nor was that the end of it all. Two weeks later Shabaz Bhatti, a Christian 
member of the Federal Cabinet, in which he occupied the position of Minister of Minorities, 
suffered a similar fate in Islamabad as he was being driven to work.  
 
Editorial in The Friday Times commented of Salman Taseer’s assassination as follows: 
 
The wanton assassination of Salmaan Taseer, Governor of Punjab, could be a tragic 
watershed in the history of Pakistan as it crumbles in the face of a severe onslaught 
by extremist religious ideology and passions. The tragedy is that some elements of 
the state are co-sponsors while others are hopeless accessories after the fact.  
 
Mr Taseer opined that the blasphemy law should be amended to ensure that mischief 
mongers could not exploit it for mundane ends. He wasn’t alone in advocating this 
line of action. Indeed, quite apart from the moderate silent majority, even the most 
rigid mainstream defenders of the blasphemy law admit that procedural changes can 
improve its efficacy and fairness. But the media and mullahs distorted the picture and 
painted him as an apostate. The mullahs put head money on him, the media 
frenetically drummed up their demands, and the state condoned it all.  
 
Mr Taseer was moved by the plight of Aasia Bibi, a poor Christian woman, who had 
been awarded the death sentence by a court for blaspheming against Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). The facts suggested there had been a miscarriage of justice, a 
fairly frequent occurrence in such passionately charged cases. So he moved the 
President of Pakistan to commute her death sentence. But, under pressure from 
religious extremists, the Lahore High Court put a spoke in the wheels of the 
government by signaling its displeasure. As the media whipped up the chorus of 
extremist voices arrayed against the Governor, the President balked and the Prime 
Minister retreated shamelessly: “This is the Governor’s personal point of view, I am a 
Syed, my government has no intention to dilute the blasphemy law”, declared Mr 
Yusuf Raza Gilani self-righteously. Isolated and condemned, Mr Taseer became a 
sitting duck for the extremists. 
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The killer, Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, an Elite Force commando, brazenly maneuvered 
with police officials to join Mr Taseer’s security detail on the ill-fated day. This, 
despite a forceful note on file by the Regional Police Officer in 2008 that Qadri should 
be removed from VIP security duty because of his extremist religious views. He took 
his commando colleagues into confidence and they stood by passively as he pumped 
26 bullets into his target. There has not been a more outrageous lapse on the part of 
the police than this in Pakistan’s history. 
 
The political parties showed their pathetic colours after the assassination. Not a 
single politician from the ruling party or opposition had the guts to unequivocally 
condemn the passion behind the killing. Indeed, the PPP turned the state tragedy 
into a political conspiracy against the party and democracy. The opposition that 
routinely thunders against real and imagined excesses barely managed to mutter a 
word or two about the “unfortunate” incident. It was left to a group of Islamabad 
lawyers – part of the famed “lawyers’ movement” – to shower rose petals on the 
assassin when he was brought to court to be remanded to the police. Civil society – 
that wonderfully elusive term denoting the conscience of society – could muster only 
a couple of hundred protestors the day after in contrast to the thousands of internet 
users who declared Qadri a hero on Facebook! 
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/cgi-bin/tftstoryeditorial.pl  
 
In an article in The Guardian published in the aftermath of Shabaz Bhatti’s assassination, 
Peter Preston wrote as follows:  
 
Take the young people of so many Islamic nations struggling to secure their 
democratic freedoms. Take large, very powerful armies used to running or controlling 
the show. Take big pinches of poverty, frustration and religious fanaticism. Spice with 
visceral violence. Stir briskly – and what have you got? Welcome back to Pakistan. 
We may be hoping for good things in Cairo and praying for good things in Libya. But 
good things, ominously enough, don't happen in Jinnah's "Pure State" any longer. 
Now here's one especially dismal thing among many others, because it tests 
principle as well as feeble political resolve. Shahbaz Bhatti, Islamabad's minister for 
minorities, is assassinated outside his home by four assailants who leave Taliban 
tracts behind them. Bhatti was a Christian, speaking out for an increasingly 
oppressed minority and ceaselessly advocating the repeal of Pakistan's blasphemy 
laws. 
But a couple of weeks ago, while the world was watching Cairo and Tripoli, his own 
prime minister, quietly abandoned any attempt to repeal Pakistan's blasphemy laws – 
and the death penalty for breaking them. The battling woman backbencher who'd 
pushed for abolition retreated. The ministries working on amendments threw them 
away. Blasphemy, as defined in the statute book by Pakistan's last military dictator 
but one, remains a capital offence. 
 
So the Christian peasant farm-worker and mother of four, Aasia Bibi, whose case 
crystallises the whole sorry debacle, remains in prison and in fear for her life. So the 
governor of Punjab province, Salmaan Taseer, murdered by his own bodyguard for 
speaking out, remains unavenged. Remember how 90 lawyers put their hands up 
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and volunteered to defend Taseer's killer for free. Remember how the elected 
government of the Pakistan's People Party, the party Taseer belonged to, did nothing 
but mumble. Remember how it promised reform then shuffled away. Don't forget, 
then, that Shahbaz Bhatti's murder comes as a direct consequence of the 
pusillanimity of an elected government. 
 
It is the supposed bulwark of freedom, of democracy, of the supreme rule of law that 
we all like to hymn at suitably euphoric moments. But, at a time of true test, President 
Zardari and his ministers slide away. Why does this debacle, in its way, seem so 
much worse than Islamabad's lurching efforts to subdue the Taliban and give the 
west the help it craves in the battle against terrorism? Because the issues are clear 
enough. Because there's no need to get tangled in Afghan blame games, nor rows 
about CIA agents and American imperialism. Because this crisis is all about 
Pakistan. 
 
Zardari's PPP is the supposed torch-carrier of enlightenment and reform here: a 
force for change amid a gaggle of parties in thrall to religious zealotry, and a foe of 
the army's tendency to play Islamic cards itself when its hegemony is threatened. 
There's no possible doubt which side it ought to be on. There isn't even much doubt 
which side it took as the case of Aasia Bibi developed. But now frailty leads its 
leaders by the nose. 
 
Why? Of course you can blame them for personal fear: Bhatti's death underlines the 
grim message of Taseer. Speak out and you may not live long. Taliban extremism 
claims more victims every day. But the real problem is that, across Pakistan, ordinary 
people taught by ordinary mullahs to reach extraordinary conclusions, have come to 
side with the blasphemy laws as well. They don't want repeal. They want matters to 
rest as they are. Crude democracy, in a way, wants Aasia Bibi punished – and so for 
Pakistan's 4% of Christians to live in constant fear. There are thousands of relatively 
liberal, more educated voices in play; but there are many more millions who see 
nothing wrong as lawyers queue to plead their sad case. A sentence out of place 
means death: killing those who find this law grotesque seems to mean instant 
heroism. 
 
Who will draw a line and turn the tide? No president, present or future, you can see. 
Not a feeble, flailing Zardari. Not his old adversary, Nawaz Sharif and his Muslim 
League. Not some general waiting in the wings. The difficulty is that there is no one, 
and no concerted body of opinion, who can join, let alone hope to win, this debate for 
what may come to symbolise the destiny of Pakistan. For tolerance, for restraint, for 
the ability to live side by side in a truly free world? If Cairo adds a spoonful of hope, 
Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad bring only the recipes of despair. 
 
Taken overall, the consequences of these developments are quite clear. In contemporary 
Pakistan the tsunami of neo-fundamentalism has grown so strong, and the properly 
constituted authorities have become so weak, that the former can readily overwhelm the latter 
over issues of ‘blasphemy’ – which boils down in the end to a popular view, whipped up by 
the neo-fundamentalists, that those who cannot accept the theological premises of their neo-
orthodox vision of Islam are ipso facto kaffirs, unbelievers, who have no legitimate place in 
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Pakistan. Hence whilst liberal voices in the administration and the upper reaches of the 
judiciary have so far managed to ensure that the most egregious punishments laid down in the 
Hudood ordinance and the Blasphemy Law are not implemented by the formal institutions of 
the State (although they are now increasing danger of losing their lives if they show an over-
eager commitment in that direction), the formal institutions of the state are both unable and 
unwilling to offer significant protection to those who find their lives threatened by an ever 
more powerful body of non-state actors – the many splinter groups (of which the Khatm-e-
Nabuwaat is only a single example – who are ready and willing to teach their chosen targets 
amongst Pakistan’s religious minorities a lesson: namely that their only proper fate is to be 
subjected to ethnic and religious cleansing.   
 
7. A further addendum added on 9th July 2011 
As the following exerts from the Pakistani Press serve to demonstrate, the situation in which 
members of the Ahmadi minority find themselves appears to have deteriorated yet further in 
recent months as the activities of those committed to the neo-fundamentalist view that all 
Ahmadis are wajib uk qatl (deserve to be killed) have becomes steadily more audacious, and 
the willingness – and indeed the ability – of the activities of contain their actions has grown 
steadily more attenuated.  
 
Islamabad  9th July 2011 
 
Last year, more than 80 people were killed in Lahore at two mosques of the Ahmadi 
sect. The retired military officer – he too did not want to be named – and others who 
survived speak of neighbors distributing sweets in the streets of Lahore. Only a few 
— mainly in the liberal English media — spoke out strongly to condemn the attacks. 
This year Punjab’s provincial governor Salman Taseer was assassinated at a 
cosmopolitan shopping center in Islamabad for questioning the country’s blasphemy 
laws – legal provisions often used to justify violence against Ahmadis and other 
minorities. His murderer was celebrated as a hero.  
Western diplomats and many Pakistani analysts often express concern about a 
society which is becoming more permissive about settling religious and political 
differences through violence, and about a state which is unable to impose the rule of 
law even in its sleepy capital Islamabad. 
Punjab-based militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, blamed by India and the 
United States for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai which killed 166 people, are 
banned but have yet to be disarmed and dismantled. The army says it does not want 
to tackle all militant groups at once for fear of driving them into a dangerous coalition, 
or splintering them into fragments it can no longer contain. 
But since these groups were once nurtured by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
agency to fight India, many suspect the army of deliberately retaining these groups 
as insurance against Pakistan’s bigger neighbor, a charge it denies. The result is 
widespread confusion in the public about exactly what the state and the army are 
trying to achieve on counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. 
http://www.dawn.com/2011/07/09/rehab-for-the-radicalised.html   
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FAISALABAD:  9th July 2009 
Pamphlets labelling members of the Ahmadiyya community “Wajibul Qatl” (‘liable to 
be murdered’), and inciting people to publicly attack followers of the faith, are being 
openly and widely circulated in Punjab’s textile industry hub Faisalabad, The Express 
Tribune has learnt. 
Even more startling is the fact that the pamphlet contains a list of names of Ahmadi 
industrialists, doctors and businesses. The first name is that of a cloth house, three 
owners of which were gunned down in a brazen attack last year. 
The pamphlets bear the name of the All-Pakistan Students Khatm-e-Nubuwat 
Federation and are being handed out at all main shopping plazas and important 
commercial centres of the city. The pamphlet says: “To shoot such people is an act 
of jihad and to kill such people is an act of sawab.” 
Reacting sharply over distribution of such literature, Umoor-e-Aama Jama’at 
Ahmadiyya, Faisalabad, has said that the propaganda campaign being carried out 
unhindered by some fanatic religious groups under patronage of law-enforcing 
agencies and the provincial government. The jama’at has also blamed the Punjab 
government for ignoring myriad protests lodged by the province’s Ahmadiyya 
community. It says that such religious fanatics are being encouraged by inaction on 
the part of government agencies. 
The jama’at’s secretary Mahmood Ahmad, in an email addressed to the province’s 
home secretary and police chief, and Faisalabad’s regional police officer, has written: 
“We have time and again approached police authorities against hate literature but 
nothing has been done so far. This collapse of law and order can be traced to the 
cowardice, inefficiency and incompetence of law enforcement agencies.” 
Ahmad points out that it is easy to trace the pamphlet’s source as even its publisher’s 
mobile number is brazenly given in print. This also shows the publisher’s disdain 
towards Pakistan’s laws and agencies enforcing them. “Our mouths have been taped 
shut. Our hands have been tied. I am writing this in the hope that somewhere 
somehow this letter finds its way to a patriotic police or other official who takes a 
fearless stand for the sake of Pakistan,” the email says. 
Corroborating the view expressed by Ahmad, police officials seemed reluctant to take 
the matter seriously. City police chief Rai Tahir Hussain also said he had no 
information about the pamphlets. Faisalabad DSP Mian Khalid also pleaded 
ignorance on the matter, and said that the Kotwali SHO would have the information. 
When contacted, SHO Malik Muhammad Shahid said that since no complaint has 
been made, there was no question of taking action. 
Published in The Express Tribune, June 9th, 2011. 
 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/185179/targeting-minorities-no-friend-to-ahmadis-in-




KARACHI:  19th June 2011 
On a Friday afternoon, there is pin-drop silence around the Ahmadi place of worship 
in Karachi’s Drigh Road area. Worshippers quietly enter through a side door, 
watched over by a number of men on patrol and security cameras affixed to the 
building. Just down the lane, the imam of Bilal Masjid peppers his sermon with anti-
Ahmadi remarks. The strains of his sermon can be heard throughout the 
neighbourhood, including the men standing guard outside their place of worship. 
Friday prayers are under way in both buildings, but only one congregation is allowed 
to practice its faith openly. 
At the crossroads of the mosque and the place of worship is a marker for the ‘Khatm-
e-Nabuwwat’ roundabout, a silent but potent public reminder of the power of the 
religio-political party in Pakistan. “There was a rally here a few months ago,” recalls a 
resident. “About 2,000 people attended and it was organised by the Tahaffuz 
Namoos-e-Risalat movement. They reaffirmed their faith in the finality of the 
Prophethood (peace be upon him), and then decided to rename this roundabout as a 
memento of the rally. After all, we are all Muslims, this is our faith.” 
Sunni Tehreek (ST) flags flutter in the area, whose walls are covered with grafitti, 
declaring the area to be Sunni Nagar. “These clerics, Sunni Tehreek… they’re all one 
and the same,” remarks a shopkeeper who has worked near the Ahmadi place of 
worship for 25 years. He has witnessed the area’s clerics raging against the 
Ahmadiyya community for placing barricades near their place of worship. There have 
been incidents of firing in the area as well. Thoughtfully, he says, “The problem is 
that Muslims have increasingly become intolerant.” 
A poster for a June 2 Tahaffuz Namoos-e-Risalat conference is still plastered to the 
wall of the Ahmadis’ building. A few months ago, activists reportedly barged in and 
demanded that the Kalima, a verse declaring Muslim faith, be erased from a wall 
within the place of worship’s premises. “This centre has been here since before you 
or I were born,” says the shopkeeper. Another resident said it was at least 40 years 
old. 
Attendance at prayers at Ahmadi places of worship in Karachi has slowly picked up 
after the 2010 Lahore attacks. “We have stopped women and children from coming 
to the centres because we fear that they will be targeted first, similar to the Lahore 
attacks,” says Masood Khan, a senior representative of the Ahmadiyya community. 
“Praying is also difficult and it gets quite suffocating – we have to close all the 
windows and doors so that no sound can be heard outside.” Outside is where a mob 
— literally and physically —exists. Just like the cleric at Bilal Masjid, mosque 
speakerphones are regularly used to incite hatred. 
While Punjab has been the breeding ground for anti-Ahmadi sentiment, the minority 
in Sindh faces targeted assassinations, discrimination and blasphemy cases filed on 
flimsy charges. Reviled due to a decades-old campaign, Ahmadis have nowhere to 
turn to, not even the state. A lieutenant, who was awarded the Sword of Honour, was 
forced to leave the navy because his faith meant he would never be promoted. A 
woman was widowed twice because her husbands were practicing doctors. Flyers 
are openly distributed, asking people to boycott Ahmadi-run businesses and execute 
 27
their owners. “We have brought these incidents … to the police’s notice so many 
times,” says Khan. “But they do nothing beyond occasionally sending a policeman or 
two.” 
The police also have their own biases. Khan recalls that two officers refused to drink 
water offered to them by Ahmadis. “The Central Investigation Department has 
several men in its custody who confessed that they wanted to target Ahmadis and 
Shias. But they have never been presented in court.” Even then, Khan says, the 
police in Karachi are better than those in the Punjab. Khan praises former Sindh 
home minister Zulfiqar Mirza for proactively listening to their problems. “The police 
will at least send someone. The security apparatus was concerned after the attacks 
in Lahore and we discussed measures. But we asked for Rangers to be deployed on 
Fridays and that has not happened.” 
After a lifetime spent in fear, Ahmadis in Karachi who can afford to relocate are 
packing up their bags. At least 300 to 400 people have reportedly left. The 
Ahmadiyya community in Karachi is at least 20,000 strong. Others hail from rural 
Sindh, especially Sanghar. This district has seen numerous cases of violence and 
Section 295-C cases (which carries the death penalty) filed by a cleric, Maulana 
Hamadi. “[He] sits in Sanghar and files cases against people sitting miles away in 
Rabwah!” exclaims Qaiser Shahzad, a Karachi-based businessman. 
In Karachi, Ahmadis living in Mehmoodabad have been gunned down in the past 
decade, with up to six cases in the last three years alone. One of them included a 
doctor who chose to work in the poor area. He was killed as he stopped at a speed 
breaker on his way home. Twenty-five families from Manzoor Colony have 
emigrated. “We don’t tell our children that they will face discrimination. We don’t want 
to poison their minds at a young age,” Khan says. “But at school they are inevitably 
discriminated against. Our girls come back home and say they don’t want to go to 
college.” Ahmadi families prefer sending their children to schools run by Parsis and 
Christians – also minorities. According to Shahzad, admissions are a no-go once 
school realise what the family’s faith is. 
Intolerance has spread to other areas as well. In Badin, an Ahmadi centre was 
targeted during an event for women. Incited by a cleric, men besieged the centre for 
eight hours. It took Zulfiqar Mirza (who was elected as an MPA from Badin) to clamp 
down. In January, a leaflet threatening an Ahmadi businessman was circulated in 
Goth Saban Dasti in Badin, which stated: “Such an apostate should be killed and his 
business should be banned all over Pakistan. We demand that the government of 
Pakistan take immediate action, otherwise the people will have to do this job on their 
own.” 
Karachi’s business community, according to Khan and Shahzad, is generally 
accepting of Ahmadis, especially those whose operations have been established for 
decades. However, Shahzad says in a resigned tone, “You can tell the difference in 
the way they meet us. They work with us because they have to.” Discrimination has 
also swept the armed forces and civil bureaucracy. “From Chaudhry Zafarullah to 
high-ranking generals, Ahmadis were always represented in the top ranks. But now 
we barely have a few people at top positions in the civil bureaucracy. In Ziaul Haq’s 
era, this [discrimination] was implemented — there are no promotions. Ahmadis don’t 
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even clear interviews for government or military jobs now, despite being highly 
qualified.” 
Discrimination, Khan says, is also found among old friends. “I know that they don’t 
want to dine with me.” “Look, people believe that we are wajibul qatl [liable to be 
killed]. This thought is reflected in our assemblies.” Anti-Ahmadi sentiment and 
extremism, the men said, has increased in society over the past few years. Laws 
pertaining to Ahmadis — particularly those introduced in the 1980s — have provided 
legal backing to the hate being propagated in society. Anti-Ahmadi graffiti routinely 
appears near places of worship, and the gate of one building was fired on recently in 
Steel Town. Yet, Khan and Shahzad say, they have learned to live with the ever-
present fear. “We are sitting openly,” says Khan. “But someone has to come forward 
on behalf of the community. We don’t consider ourselves minorities. We are 




8. A further addendum added on 15th July 2012 
8.1. ICG report on Islamic Parties in Pakistan dated 12th December 2011 
In a further illuminating on the growing influence of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan, 
this report noted that  
 
Although the Islamic parties were routed in the 2008 elections, they remain well 
organised, retain a committed activist base and can still impede vital reforms. While 
no longer in power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan, as they were 
from 2002 to 2007, their influence on some major national issues, particularly Islamic 
legislation, remains significant. As such, their role in the polity should not be ignored, 
even if their electoral strength is limited. Through their ultra-orthodox and 
exclusionary ideologies, the Islamic parties covered in this report are largely 
responsible for the religious intolerance, sectarian violence and militancy that 
threatens the security of the Pakistani citizen and the state.  
Yet, the Islamic parties, particularly the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-
F), but also the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), remain significant political entities due to their 
ability to mobilise street power, their influence on public institutions, including major 
universities, and, in the JUI-F’s case, sizeable pockets of support in some Pashtun-
majority districts, particularly in KPK and Balochistan.  
Equally important, they are able to leverage a legal and judicial system that, due to 
earlier Islamisation programs, provides the Islamist lobby with a powerful political 
apparatus. Furthermore, the Islamic parties have, linking up with anti-government 
forces such as Imran Khan’s Tehreek-i-Insaaf, joined street protests since late-2011, 
calling for the PPP-led government’s ouster. 
General perceptions about increasing conservatism in Pakistan, particularly after the 
assassinations of the Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, in January 2011 and the 
central government’s minority affairs minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, two months later, for 
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opposing the blasphemy laws, are so far unsubstantiated. They are certainly not 
reflected in any visible increase in Islamic parties’ popularity. Nevertheless, many 
Islamic, particularly Deobandi, parties are the beneficiaries of an environment of 
rising Islamist militancy. Even traditionally more moderate Barelvi politics has 
become increasingly militant: in 2009, many Barelvi parties, including the Jamiat-e-
Ulema Pakistan (JUP), aligned with the militant Sunni Tehreek to establish a coalition 
called the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), which strongly opposes any amendments to 
discriminatory blasphemy laws and supports Governor Taseer’s assassin. 
An Islamist takeover in Pakistan is highly unlikely, whether through militant violence 
or the ballot box. Nevertheless, so long as the Islamic parties are able to pressure 
governments, through parliamentary and/or often violent street politics, they will 
continue to obstruct vital democratic reforms, thus reinforcing an environment in 
which religious intolerance, vigilantism, and militancy thrive, the rule of law continues 
to deteriorate, and elected governments are unable to stabilise. 
Even as the Islamist landscape evolves, the JUI-F and the JI remain the two most 
influential Islamic parties, representing the two main strands of Pakistani religious 
politics, Deobandi orthodoxy and Islamic revivalism respectively. The JUI-F depends 
on electoral success to be a major national level player. The JI, which considers itself 
“non-sectarian”, lacks an electoral constituency of its own but is arguably the most 
organised of the major Islamic parties. Moreover, its founder, Syed Abul Ala 
Maududi, is widely credited with introducing a political discourse that other Islamic 
parties, even opponents, still draw on. Relying as it often does on violence in the 
street and using a committed worker base, the JI is able to influence debate even 
while it lacks electoral support. 
Even while taking positions against religious extremism, the Ahle Hadith has not 
diluted a rigid and exclusionary ideology that encourages the very forces the party 
claims it opposes. For example, a May 2010 meeting of the Aalmi Majlis-e-Tahffuz-e-
Khatm-e-Nubuwwat, chaired by Mir, demanded the removal of Ahmadis from all 
important government positions. Mir also continues to attend and address rallies and 
events by Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the renamed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, which espouses the 
Ahle Hadith school of Islam. 
The role and impact of smaller Islamic parties also demand scrutiny, particularly their 
ability to mobilise on the streets and on campuses, as well as their links, much like 
the JI and the JUI-F, to militant outfits. 
It is also worth when the Report goes on to present more detailed accounts of the current 
ideological perspectives of these rival Islamist groups, as well as the many differences 
between them, one of the few issues on which they can all agree is the need to defend the 
integrity of Islam by excluding Ahmadis from the fold, and hence on the strict enforcement of 
the blasphemy law.  
   
Since I added the previous addendum a year ago, the level of popular hostility towards 
members of Pakistan’s non-Sunni religious minorities, and most especially towards the 
Ahmadis has intensified yet further, partly because of lack of significant efforts by the 
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authorities to curb the rising tide of religious polarization which is sweeping across the 
country, but above all as a result of the efforts of neo-fundamentalist preachers to condemn, 
and more accurately to abuse, all those whose theological outlook differs from their own. 
Moreover, as Mobeen Azhar has reported in great detail in two episodes of the Heart and 
Soul program on the BBC World Service,5 their evangelistic efforts are no longer solely 
restricted to sermons broadcast from the minarets of their mosques: they have also begun to 
occupy key slots in on Pakistan’s myriad TV satellite channels. Whilst the original broadcasts 
are well worth listening to in their own right, a much-compressed version of the broadcasts 
can be found at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18729683 in an article entitled ‘The 
Rise of Pakistani’s Televangelists’, which I have reproduced below:  
 
Islamic groups in Pakistan were initially hostile to cable TV because of 
concerns about "obscene" foreign imports, but religion now dominates the 
airwaves. A new breed of Islamic TV evangelist has emerged, leading to a 
confrontation with liberals. 
On any day of the week, television in Pakistan is a potent cocktail of soap operas, 
fiery political debate and, increasingly, pop-Islam. This last strand of programming 
has a set format. Viewers call up to ask questions about Islamic rulings on everything 
from hair removal to ethical mortgages. The anchors - part celebrity, part religious 
leaders - dish out bite-size fatwas (theological rulings) for audiences with a seemingly 
insatiable appetite for religion on TV.  
Controversy has surrounded many of these programmes and the pious presenters 
that front them.  Farhat Hashmi has been accused of embezzling funds from her 
television show and fleeing to Canada to avoid prosecution, although she denies any 
wrongdoing. And Mehar Bukhari, known for her political interviews, sparked outrage 
by declaring the politician she was speaking to was a heretic. Another mullah clashed 
with a Bollywood actress on live television after condemning her behaviour - that clip 
subsequently became a viral hit. 
But the best-known of all the TV evangelists is Dr Amir Liaqat. From a glossy 
television studio above a parade of run-down shops in Karachi, he had an audience 
of millions for Alim aur Alam, a live one-hour show that went out five days a week 
across Pakistan. The programme allowed Dr Liaqat to play the role of a religious 
"Agony Uncle", remedying the religious dilemmas of his audience.  
In September 2008, Liaqat dedicated an entire episode to exploring the beliefs of the 
Ahmedis, a Muslim sect which has been declared as "un-Islamic" by much of the 
orthodoxy. In it, two scholars said that anyone who associated with false prophets 
was "worthy of murder" (wajibul qatl). Dr Khalid Yusaf, an Ahmedi Muslim, watched 
the programme with his family, and says he was shocked that a mainstream channel 
                                                 




would broadcast this kind of material. "They talked about murder as a religious duty. 
A duty for 'good' Muslims."  
Within 24 hours of the broadcast, a prominent member of the Ahmedi community 
was shot dead in the small town of Mirpur Khass. Twenty-four hours later Khalid 
Yusaf's father, another Ahmedi community leader, was killed by two masked 
gunmen. Liaqat has distanced himself from the shootings. "I have no regrets 
because it has nothing to do with me," he says. "I'm hurt by what happened and I'm 
sorry for the families but it has nothing to do with me or anything that was said on my 
programme."  
Although Liaqat attracted some criticism within the comment pages of Pakistan's 
broadsheets, the Ahmedi incident hasn't damaged his career. He's being paid to 
endorse a brand of cooking oil and he's soon to launch his debut album of religious 
songs. He continues to present his television show and has this month returned to 
his old channel Geo, one of the most popular networks in Pakistan.  
The surge in independently-owned television channels is the legacy of General 
Musharraf's presidency. The opening up of Pakistan's TV networks was welcomed as 
a democratisation of the press, but critics now claim the industry is in dire need of 
regulation and that celebrity-Mullahs are peddling a message of intolerance.  
In principle at least, the Pakistani television industry must adhere to a strict code of 
practice. PEMRA, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, is a 
government organisation entrusted with policing the nation's TV channels. One of 
their stated aims is to stop the broadcast of programmes that promote "communal 
and sectarian attitudes and disharmony".  
Critics have branded the organisation as "toothless" after they failed to take any 
action against Liaqat. PEMRA's general manager said he didn't want to speak about 
the regulation of religious broadcasters as it would be like "starting a fire". One 
person who has been vocal in her criticism of television evangelists is Veena Malik. 
She's a native Pakistani who became a major player in Bollywood. She faced the 
wrath of TV Mullahs for her appearance in Big Boss, the Indian version of the Big 
Brother franchise. On returning to Pakistan, Malik was involved in a live television 
clash with a Mullah, who declared her conduct "shameful" and "un-Islamic". Malik's 
unrelenting defence turned her into a hero for some and a YouTube sensation.  
"I was speaking for myself when I said it is up to every woman what she chooses to 
wear," she says. "The struggle for women's rights in Pakistan is completely linked to 
religious minority rights. There are few people that can speak out like this. I can so I 
did."  
The "Veena vs the Mullah" incident turned Malik into a symbol of struggle for 
Pakistani liberals. Mansoor Raza from Citizens for Democracy, a campaign group 
that has openly supported religious minorities, says Malik's new-found status as a 
darling of the left is a sign of the times. "I know housewives who wear the hijab," he 
says. "They call Veena Malik a hero. She said what we all wanted to say. Our 
politicians are failing us and so it's left to film stars like Veena Malik to speak out." 
But not everyone in Pakistan believes that there's a problem with television 
evangelists. The channels that broadcast religious programming claim that they are 
 32
just responding to the demands of the audience, and they are providing accessible 
answers to complex theological problems. Liaqat says these programmes have 
appeal because they educate. "I want to spread a message of love. Despite all the 
controversy I am still here and audiences love me because people want to learn 
about religion. That's why people watch these programmes. People want to learn."  
Badar Alam, editor of the Karachi Herald, believes that television could be changing 
the way Islam is practised in Pakistan - for instance, more women wearing the niqab. 
He believes that middle-class housewives who tune into the religious shows are 
learning cultural practices that are quite alien to Pakistan. The flux between 
mainstream Pakistani Islam and a more hardline version of the faith is being fought 
out on Pakistani TV screens each day. Dr Khalid Yusaf believes his father was a 
casualty of this battle. "I just want these people to think about what they do. For the 
sake of humanity, don't make programmes like this. "My father was someone that 
everyone loved. We lost him because of a television programme. I hope no-one ever 
has to go through this."  
In the light of all this any suggestion that popular hostility to the presence of Pakistan’s 
Ahmadi minority has reached its peak must be discarded: on the contrary all the indicators 
suggest that its intensity is still growing exponentially  
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